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CIRCUMVENTING STATE COURT
ORDERS OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION: A
BANKRUPTCY LOOPHOLE
Bankruptcy law has developed over the years to provide the financially over-extended debtor relief from mounting debts.' Presently, however, the bankruptcy laws are being used to enjoin both
state court criminal proceedings and state court orders of criminal
restitution. Criminal debtors have increasingly used certain provisions of the bankruptcy laws in an attempt to discharge state court
criminal restitution orders.2 "Criminal restitution" is a process
whereby criminal debtors are required to repay debt in lieu of incarceration. Ideally, they are rehabilitated and made to understand
that society has been injured by their actions.' Criminal restitution
is meant to give the unhardened criminal the opportunity to rectify
a previous wrong. An order of criminal restitution does not, however,
create the debtor-creditor type relationship that normally exists in a
4
bankruptcy proceeding.
In this regard, section 523(a) of the federal Bankruptcy Code
delineates several exceptions to the types of debt that are dischargeable in bankruptcy. 5 Congress enacted section 523(a) because it felt
1. See generally H. REMINGTON, 1 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 6-10 (1964)
(explanation of legislative intent behind Bankruptcy Code) [hereinafter cited as
REMINGTON].

2. See infra text accompanying notes 40-66.
Currently, the bankruptcy courts employ five different methods to determine the
dischargeability of a state court order of criminal restitution. In a number of jurisdictions, the courts hold that criminal proceedings must be enjoined. See infra text accompanying notes 40-48. In other jurisdictions, the criminal action is allowed to proceed, but the bankruptcy court enjoins the creditor from receiving any type of
restitution. See infra text accompanying notes 49-55. Another bankruptcy court currently holds that restitution is a dischargeable debt in bankruptcy. See infra text
accompanying notes 56-66. However, not all bankruptcy courts discharge state court
orders of criminal restitution. There are a number of courts that hold that restitution
is not a debt contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore, not dischargeable.
See infra text accompanying notes 89-106. In addition, courts in some jurisdictions
state that the bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with a state
court criminal proceeding. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88. These courts, in
reaching their decision, look to the definitions provided in section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code and conclude that restitution is not a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy.
3. See, e.g., In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 67 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); In re Johnson,
32 Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. 800, 803
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982).
4. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. at 616; In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. at 803;
In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708, 709 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1982). Currently, there are ten types of debts which are
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that certain individuals and governmental units needed protection
from debtors in bankruptcy.6 Section 523(a)(2), the false pretenses
provision, provides that debts incurred as a result of false pretenses,
false representations, actual fraud or false writings are exempt from
discharge.7 Section 523(a)(7) exempts from discharge any debt
which is represented by a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to a
governmental unit.8 As intended, creditors and governmental units
use these sections to prevent criminals from discharging certain
debts through bankruptcy proceedings. 9 Bankruptcy Courts, however, have frustrated this intended result where the type of debt is a
state court order of criminal restitution. The circumventive application of the Bankruptcy Code to state court criminal restitution orders clearly indicates a need for legislative reform.
This article begins by briefly tracing the historical background
and origins of American bankruptcy law. This will be followed by a
discussion of the bankruptcy courts' problems regarding its jurisdiction and the automatic stay of a state court criminal proceeding.
Next, this article will depict the clash that occurs between state enacted mandatory criminal restitution laws and the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution. The focus then shifts to the
bankruptcy courts' application of the Bankruptcy Code to the criminal restitution issue. Finally, two proposals will be suggested which,
if enacted, would eliminate the current problems associated with the
discharge of state criminal restitution orders by the bankruptcy
courts.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first "bankruptcy law" existed more than 3,000 years ago
nondischargeable under section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. L.

KING, 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 523.01 (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. The ten types of
debt exempt from discharge are debts for: tax on customs duty, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)
(1982); money, property or services which are incurred as a result of false pretenses,
id. § 523(a)(2); when a proof of claim has been filed, id. §523(a)(3); fraud while acting
in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny, id. § 523(a)(4); amounts owed to a
spouse, former spouse or child for maintenance or child support in connection with a
divorce decree, id. § 523(a)(5); willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
or another's property, id. § 523(a)(6); fines or penalties payable to a governmental
unit, id. § 523(a)(7); educational loans made or guaranteed by a governmental unit,
id. § 523(a)(8); liability incurred as a result of the operation of the debtor's motor
vehicle while legally intoxicated, 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(9) (West Supp. 1985); and those
debts which could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor but were waived or
denied a discharge. id. § 523(a)(9).*
6. 3 COLLIER, supra note 5, 523.05.
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982). If the debt payable under section 523(a) is compensation for actual pecuniary loss, however, the debt will not be exempt from discharge because the government is not supposed to act as a collection agency. Id.
9. 3 COLLIER, supra note 5, 523.08.
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when the Israelites were granted a release from their debts every
seven years, during the Sabbatical year.'" During the times of Julius
Ceasar, debtors were relieved of all their assets in exchange for immunity from personal punishment, 1 but were not, however, relieved
of the obligation to pay their debts.1" Modern bankruptcy law lies
between these two extremes. It developed as a necessary outgrowth
of expanding English commerce.'" It had a "quasi-criminal" origin,
starting with the bankruptcy statute used during the reign of Henry
VIII, which provided that fraudulent claims could not be discharged, but had to be paid or otherwise satisfied and distributed by
the lords having authority."' With this foundation of English law,
early American bankruptcy law was likewise primarily creditor
oriented. 15
The Founding Fathers first discussed bankruptcy regulations at
the 1787 Constitutional Convention.' 6 The delegates were concerned
primarily with the lack of commercial unity among the states and
with the inadequacy of the several states' insolvency laws.' 7 A provision was therefore drafted into the United States Constitution
which authorized Congress to establish a "uniform" set of bankruptcy laws.' 8 American bankruptcy laws have since evolved into an
10. 1 REMINGTON, supra note 1, § 7.
The first bankruptcy law was found to be impracticable, because during the seventh year businessmen would become quite worried about the debtor's mounting
debts. Id. The law read as follows:
At the end of every seven years thou shalt make a release. And this is the
manner of the release: Every creditor that lendeth aught unto his neighbor
shall release it; he shall not exact it of his neighbor or of his brother; because it
is called the Lord's release. Of a foreigner thou mayest exact it again; but that
which is thine with thy brother thine hand shall release; save when there shall
be no poor among you.

Id.

11. Id. The early laws of Caesar are thought to be the prototype of modern
bankruptcy law. Id. The law called Cessio Bonorum provided for the surrender of all
the debtor's assets and granted him immunity from personal punishment. Id. This
law was strictly voluntary and could not be invoked by the creditors. Id.
12. Id.
13. 1 REMINGTON, supra note 1, § 2. As England grew in prosperity and in the
field of commerce, it felt that its merchants needed protection from debtors. Id.
14. Id. The first English bankruptcy statute was that of 34 and 35 Henry VIII,
ch. 4 (1542). See 1 REMINGTON, supra note 1, § 3 for the full text of the statute.
15. 1 REMINGTON, supra note 1, § 3. Because the English laws were primarily
creditor oriented, a common law maxim developed that "[t]he law favors the diligent
creditor." Id. This maxim stood for the principle that the first creditor to seize a
debtor's assets by execution took precedence for his entire claim over the next creditor. Id. Shortly thereafter, a new maxim was formed, "equality is equity," which became and is now the primary principle of bankruptcy law. Id.
16. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCYT 0.02 (14th ed. 1976).
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Clause 4 provides: "To establish... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Id. This provision is the general constitutional provision which grants Congress the power to enact,
amend or repeal the bankruptcy laws. The purpose of the supremacy clause is that it

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:449

overwhelmingly complex set of statutes which regulate the liquidation or reorganization of a debtor's obligations. 9 The last major
is used to determine whether a challenged statute stands as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1970) citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941).
Responding to the constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act
of 1800 which provided that the only debts exempt from discharge were debts owed
to a state or to the United States. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, noted in, 3 COLLIER,
supra note 5, 523.01. The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was repealed just three years
after its enactment. 1 REMINGTON, supra note 1, § 7. The Act of 1800 was the United
States' first bankruptcy law. Id. It was modeled after English law and written to suppress fraudulent and criminal practices, rather than to provide a rational and equitable distribution of the debtor's estate. Id. The main reason for its repeal was that the
people of the United States resented federal laws. Id. Federal laws reminded the general public of the strongly centralized and domineering government they faced prior
to the revolution. Id.
Other bankruptcy acts followed, including the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Id. § 8.
This Act introduced voluntary bankruptcy proceedings. Id. The Act of 1841, like its
predecessor, was also repealed. Id. One of the primary reasons for its repeal was the
great physical distance between the United States Courts and the people. Id. The
bankruptcy courts were great distances apart; the people had burdensome journeys
through the backroads by stage coach to bring an action in bankruptcy. Id.
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. The Act of 1867
provided that fraudulent debts were to be included in the list of debts unaffected by
a bankruptcy proceeding. COLLIER, supra note 5, 523.01. Congress wanted to preclude those who incurred debts as a result of fraud from benefitting from the applicable bankruptcy laws at the expense of their creditors. The Act of 1867 was repealed
11 years later, again due to the distance between the courts and the people. 1 REMINGTON, supra note 1, § 9. Congress then enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. This
Act attempted to rectify prior law and provide a concise definition of insolvency. Id.
Prior to the Act of 1898, the term insolvency meant the inability of the debtor to
meet his obligations as they came due. Id. This meant that during depressed times, it
was very easy for a creditor to place a debtor in bankruptcy. Id. However, after the
Act of 1898, insolvency took on a new meaning. Insolvency now meant that the fair
market value of the debtor's assets had to be worth less than his liabilities. Id. This
Act also set up a system of laws for seizing the assets of an insolvent debtor. Id.
19. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 0.01 (14th ed. 1976). Currently, the Bankruptcy
Code is composed of eight chapters, numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15. 11 U.S.C. §§
101-1501. Chapters 7, 9, 11 and 13 provide for debtor relief. See L. KING & M. COOK,
CREDITORS'

RIGHTS,

DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY

578 (1985). The remain-

ing chapters, 1, 3, 5, and 15, contain procedural provisions applicable to chapters 7, 9,
11 and 13. Id.
Under a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor's non-exempt assets are surrendered
and sold and the proceeds are then distributed to the debtor's creditors. L. KING &
M. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY 578 (1985). If
the debtor is a business entity, the entity will cease to exist. Id. Chapter 9, "Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality," provides for a voluntary petition filed by a municipality. Id. at 579. The purpose of Chapter 9 is to prevent liquidation of a municipality's assets by working out a debt adjustment plan with the creditors. Id. Chapter 11,
"Reorganization," provides for the business debtor. Id. Chapter 13, "Adjustment of
Debts of an Individual with Regular Income," allows an individual the opportunity to
propose a plan in which the debts will be paid out of future earnings. Id. Chapter 13
can be viewed as an alternative to the liquidation process of Chapter 7. Id.
Chapter 1 contains sections on basic definitions, rules of construction, the applicability of the chapters, the power of the court, and who may be a debtor. 11 U.S.C. §
101 (1982). Chapter 3 is administrative. It contains sections on commencement of the
case, officers, administration and administrative powers, e.g., the automatic stay pro-
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change in the bankruptcy laws occurred in 1984.20 The criminal
sanctions that appeared in earlier laws, however, have disappeared
under the current laws. Instead of being held accountable under the
bankruptcy laws, criminals are now using the bankruptcy laws to
avoid state court prosecution and to discharge state court orders of
criminal restitution entered against them. The problem arises out of
a question of jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION

Congress has granted the federal district courts exclusive 1 and

original22 jurisdiction over all cases and proceedings which arise
under Title XI of the United States Code.22 By enacting the exclusive jurisdiction provision, Congress intended to prohibit state
courts from exercising jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases.2 Generally, the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, section 362(a),
stays all actions brought against a debtor in bankruptcy. Section
362(b)(1), however, provides an exception to the automatic stay provision, allowing criminal actions to proceed despite the bankruptcy
filing.
vision section 362. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-366 (1982). See also L. KING & M. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRuPTcy at 580 (1985). Chapter 5 contains provisions relating to the debtor, creditor and the estate. Id. The final chapter
in the Bankruptcy Code is Chapter 15. Chapter 15 sets forth the duties and powers of
the United States trustee and the districts in which his office will be operational. Id.
at 579. A debtor filing bankruptcy can file a petition under Chapter 7, straight bankruptcy, or under Chapter 13. A. COHEN, DEBITOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT of 1978, at 705 (1979). Eighty percent of all debtors choose to file
bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Id. A study of seven districts shows that more people
prefer to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Id.
District
Chapter 13
Chapter 7
Northern Alabama
Maine
Western Texas
Southern California
Northern Ohio
Oregon
Northern Illinois
Seven District TOTAL
All District in U.S.

76%
52
28 11
7
5
4
18
17

24%
48
72
89
93
95
96
82
83

Id.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 576.
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West Supp. 1985). Exclusive jurisdiction was given to
the federal courts in section 1334(a) to make it clear that state courts should not
exercise jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. 1 COLLIER, supra note 5, V 3.01.
22. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West Supp. 1985).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982); L. KING & M. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS'
PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY 732 (1985).

24. 1 COLLIER, supra note 5, 1 3.01. Collier states that when exclusive jurisdiction is used in conjunction with the supremacy clause of the Constitution, it will invalidate any state statute which attempts to resemble a bankruptcy statute. Id. '
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The bankruptcy statutes were so designed to help provide debtors with relief from financial over-extension, yet not provide them
shelter from the consequences of criminal acts. A strong national
policy exists against federal interference with state court criminal
proceedings.2 Section 362(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code thus contains an exception to the automatic stay provision that specifically
exempts criminal proceedings."6 By enacting this exception, Congress intended to keep the bankruptcy laws from becoming a haven
for criminal offenders. 27 Congress, however, did not leave the bankruptcy courts entirely powerless to stay a state court criminal proceeding. In enacting section 105, Congress granted federal courts the
power to issue any judgment or remove any limitation necessary to
carry out the intentions of the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code.2 8 As
a result of the exclusive and original jurisdiction provisions, section
362(b)(1) and section 105, the bankruptcy courts have the power to
pass judgment on all bankruptcy issues. An attempt has been made
in some state courts, however, to circumvent this bankruptcy court
power through the use of mandatory criminal restitution sentences.
The mandatory criminal restitution problem is most common in
"Not Sufficient Funds" (NSF) check cases. A number of states require, as part of the criminal sentence in a NSF check case, that the
debtor make restitution to the creditor-victim. 2 9 In these jurisdic-

tions, state courts demand that the debtor repay the NSF check
debt, even where a bankruptcy court has discharged the debt under
Chapters 7, 11 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Mandatory restitution
poses a unique problem because once a federal bankruptcy court has
determined that a debt has been discharged, section 524(a)(2) for25. 2 COLLIER, supra note 5, 362.05[1]. The purpose of the automatic stay
provision, section 362, is to suspend court actions which seek to divide up the
debtor's assets in an effort to collect the debt before any type of debtor relief can be
granted. Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnet Bank & Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280
(N.D. Ga. 1975). When a creditor attempts to pursue an action after the bankruptcy
petition has been filed, the attempt violates the automatic stay provision and is void
regardless of whether there was notice of the stay. 2 COLLIER, supra note 5, 362.03.
The automatic stay provision promotes equality in the distribution of assets among
creditors and protects debtors and their estates from creditor actions. Id.
362.01.
There are, however, some exceptions. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982). Section 362(b) contains eight exceptions to the automatic stay provision. This comment is concerned
with the first exception which deals with criminal proceedings against debtors. Collier
states that section 362(b)(1) is consistent with the policy of providing relief to the
financially pressed without providing a shelter for the consequences of criminal acts.
2 COLLIER, supra note 5, 362.05[1l].
26. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982).
27. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6299.
28. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West Supp. 1985). This is a very broad provision. It allows the bankruptcy court discretion to do whatever the court feels is necessary.
29. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4206(a)
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3-308(3) (1982).

19861

A Bankruptcy Loophole

bids any further action to collect the discharged debtso Hence, if the
state's criminal court action is allowed to proceed, the jurisdiction,
judgments, and the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code will be frustrated.31 However, based upon the position taken by the United
States Supreme Court,3 2 and the effect of the supremacy clause,3 s
any mandatory order to make restitution of a discharged debt is
void because it conflicts with and obstructs the express purpose of
the federal bankruptcy laws.3 '
In order to thwart the mandatory restitution requirements of
some states, several bankruptcy courts have enjoined state criminal
courts from granting any type of restitution. 5 These bankruptcy
courts reason that, under the supremacy clause, such orders constitute an impermissible infringement on the application of the federal
Bankruptcy Code. 6 There are a number of federal bankruptcy
courts, however, which have refused to enjoin state criminal courts
from ordering restitution. In these jurisdictions, the courts claim
that they do not have the authority to enjoin the state action,37 or
that restitution is not classified as debt, and is therefore not dis30. In re Barnett, 15 Bankr. 504, 510 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
31. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
32. See infra note 34.
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
34. Perez, 402 U.S. at 637; In re Barnett, 15 Bankr. at 510. In Perez, the petitioner was involved in an automobile accident. Perez, 402 U.S. at 638. The petitioner,
Perez, did not have liability insurance on his car. Id. The Pinkertons, occupants of
the second car, sued and obtained a judgment against Perez for personal injury and
property damage. Id. Subsequently, Mr. and Mrs. Perez filed bankruptcy. Id. The
District Court discharged the amount owed to the Pinkertons because they were
listed as creditors. Id. at 639. Arizona had a motor vehicle statute which specifically
provided that a debtor could not be relieved in bankruptcy of any judgment that was
imposed under that statute. Id. at 642. The Court stated that the function of that law
was very similar to the bankruptcy laws, because the state law exempted certain
debts from discharge. Id. at 648. The Court held that the Arizona statute frustrated
the purpose of the bankruptcy law and was invalid by reason of the supremacy
clause. Id. at 652.
35. See, e.g., In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (creditor
will be enjoined from accepting any restitution which results from the criminal process); In re Bray, 12 Bankr. 359, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (permanent injunction
granted to prohibit collection of debt discharged in bankruptcy).
36. See, e.g., In re Holder, 26 Bankr. at 792 (any order to make full restitution
is unconstitutional to the extent it conflicts with section 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code); In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. 917, 921 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (the state, by
forcing restitution on a criminal, would be enforcing a debt which could not be enforced in state or federal court by the victim); In re Barnett, 15 Bankr. 504, 510
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (any order to make restitution of a discharged debt conflicts
with the purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws).
37. See, e.g., Matter of Davis, 15 Bankr. 442 (Bankr. D. Del. 1981) (bankruptcy
court did not have the power to issue permanent injunction against the state criminal
court and restitution could not be enjoined), aff'd, 18 Bankr. 701 (Bankr. D. Del.),
afJ'd, 691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981)
(restitution not dischargeable and bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to interfere with state court's sentence).
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chargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.38 Under the latter reasoning,
no apparent conflict exists between the jurisdictions and powers of
the federal and state courts.
APPLICATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE TO CRIMINAL RESTITUTION

In interpreting the language of the Bankruptcy Code, federal
bankruptcy courts have created two categories of cases applicable to
criminal restitution cases.30 The first category consists of cases

where restitution is enjoined or discharged by the federal courts.
The second category consists of cases in which courts have held that
restitution is not dischargeable. Under the first category, the bankruptcy courts have enjoined the entire state criminal proceeding, enjoined the state court from granting any type of criminal restitution,
or discharged any restitution ordered by the state criminal court.
Bankruptcy courts in the second category have classified criminal
restitution as nondebt, thereby eliminating any problem with section 524(a)(2) and the supremacy clause.
Restitution Enjoined or Discharged
All of the cases from jurisdictions establishing the first category
have given criminals the necessary means to discharge state court
orders of criminal restitution."0 Typically, in these cases, the debtor
has issued NSF checks to the creditor. 41 The debtor then files for
38. See, e.g., In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (restitution
not a debt contemplated by Bankruptcy Code and it is not dischargeable); In re
Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (primary purpose of restitution is rehabilitation, therefore, restitution is not equal to debt and not dischargeable).
39. See infra notes 40-66 & 82-105.
40. Currently the following jurisdictions and the United States Supreme Court
will apparently enjoin a state court criminal proceeding. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) (federal courts will enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions when there is
a threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights); In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. 280
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (creditor who instituted criminal proceeding to collect a debt
violated automatic stay, therefore, the criminal proceeding will be enjoined); In re
Alan I. W. Frank Corp., 19 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (criminal proceeding will
be enjoined when creditor institutes criminal action after the debtor files Chapter 11);
In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (state criminal action permanently enjoined when instituted after check was discharged as a debt); In re Kaping, 13 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (state criminal proceeding will be enjoined
when the prosecution is seeking restitution); In re Bray, 12 Bankr. 359 (Bankr. M.D.
Ala. 1981) (bankruptcy court can enjoin state criminal court if an action is brought to
enforce collection of debt); In re Reid, 9 Bankr. 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (creditor
enjoined from using criminal proceeding to collect debt); In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (creditor enjoined from proceeding with criminal action because preferential status would result).
41. See, e.g., In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Alan
I.W. Frank Corp., 19 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. 917
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
However, in In re Kaping, the debtor was indicted for criminal non-support. In
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bankruptcy and has the NSF check debt discharged.2 Frequently,
the creditor will not file an objection to the dischargeability of the
debt in bankruptcy, but may instead commence criminal proceedings against the debtor.4 8 When this occurs, courts in the first category have granted an injunction prohibiting the state criminal court
from proceeding with the action.
The primary reason advanced by the bankruptcy courts for
granting an injunction is that the creditor's real motivation behind
the criminal action is to collect the discharged debt, rather than to
seek punishment for the criminal's conduct." This motivation is
clearly demonstrated in statements made by the creditor or his attorney that the criminal action will be dropped if prompt payment
is made to the creditor. 4 These bankruptcy courts have stated that
the creditor obtains an unfair advantage over the other unsecured
creditors when this occurs. 40 For example, by allowing the criminal
action to proceed, the creditor is permitted to forego any partial
payment that might be paid in bankruptcy in anticipation of getting
full reimbursement by way of restitution. This gives the creditor
preferential status over the other creditors, which the courts suggest
re Kaping, 13 Bankr. 621, 622 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981). The debtor filed bankruptcy and
was granted a discharge. Id. The Kaping court held that the principal motivation
behind the indictment was to obtain restitution, and secondarily, to obtain probation
for the debtor to ensure payment. Id. Therefore, the bankruptcy court stated that the
State of Oregon was permanently enjoined from further prosecuting the debtor. Id.
In In re Reid, the debtor entered into an agreement to build a fish pond for the
creditor in return for the top soil on the land. In re Reid, 9 Bankr. 830, 831 (Bankr.
M.D. Ala. 1981). The debtor removed and sold the top soil without completing the
fish pond. The creditor refused to allow another contractor to complete the fish pond
and instituted criminal proceedings for grand larceny after the debtor filed Chapter
13. Id. The Reid court held that the criminal proceeding was instituted to obtain
preferential treatment and concluded that the criminal proceeding must be enjoined.
Id. at 832.
42. See, e.g., In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. at 281 (debtor and his wife filed a joint
petition in bankruptcy); In re Alan LW. Frank Corp., 19 Bankr. at 42 (debtor filed
for reorganization under Chapter 11); In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. at 918 (debtor filed a
voluntary bankruptcy petition).
43. See, e.g., In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. at 281 (creditor did not participate in the
bankruptcy proceeding); In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. at 919 (creditor failed to file a
complaint against the dischargeability of the debt); In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740, 741
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (debtor's plan under Chapter 1 without objection).
44. The bankruptcy court stated that the state courts are being used by creditors for their own advantages and not for the vindication of the public's rights against
criminals. See supra note 40.
45. In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. at 282 (prosecuting attorney offered to dismiss
criminal charges if full restitution was made to creditor); In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr.
at 920 (Assistant District Attorney General offered a nolle on the criminal case upon
payment of restitution and costs); In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. at 742 (prosecutor's activities were not directed at criminal penalties but at enforcing payment of criminal
sanctions).
46. In re Alan I.W. Frank Corp., 19 Bankr. at 43 (creditor would gain unfair
advantage over other unsecured creditors); In re Reid, 9 Bankr. at 832 (creditor
would gain preferential treatment over other creditors).
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is against the Bankruptcy Code policy.4 7 As a result of this reasoning, some federal bankruptcy courts have held that criminal actions
will be enjoined only when brought in bad faith."
Along similar lines, courts in other jurisdictions have enjoined
the creditor from accepting any form of restitution from the
debtor.' 9 To support their decisions, these courts have relied on section 524(a)(2), the effect of discharge provision. 0 Case law has focused on a Supreme Court decision"1 which held that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is invalid
as a result of the application of the supremacy clause."
For example, in In re Barnett, the debtor had pled guilty to a
criminal charge of writing a NSF check.53 The following month the
debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition.' The Barnett court enjoined the
county attorney from requesting or recommending restitution and
further stated that any such order would violate the effect of discharge provision.55 Therefore, in jurisdictions which follow the Barnett reasoning, state criminal actions can legitimately proceed, provided that restitution is not requested.
Only one jurisdiction currently discharges outright a state court
47. In re Reid, 9 Bankr. 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981).
48. See supra note 40.
49. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (state statutes which frustrate Bankruptcy Code are unconstitutional because of the supremacy clause); In re
Godfrey, 472 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (bankruptcy court prohibited debtor from
paying and creditors from receiving any money in satisfaction of the debts); In re
Allman, 43 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (county prosecutor enjoined from revoking debtor's probation for failure to make restitution); In re Redenbaugh, 37
Bankr. 383 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984) (creditor enjoined from requesting or receiving any
form of restitution); In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (creditor
will be enjoined from accepting any restitution which may result from the criminal
process); Johnson v. Lindsey, 16 Bankr. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (bankruptcy
court would enjoin state's attorney from using the criminal process to force the
debtor to pay restitution); In re Barnett, 15 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981)
(county attorney enjoined from recommending or requesting restitution).
50. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985). Section 524(a)(2) operates as an
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or any act to collect, recover or offset any debt that was discharged in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
51. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
52. Id. In Perez, Arizona enacted a statute which exempted from bankruptcy
any judgments obtained in actions involving a motor vehicle accident. Id. at 642. The
Perez court stated that the function of the Arizona statute closely resembled the
function of the bankruptcy laws. Id. at 652. The Court concluded that because the
Arizona legislature was attempting to carve out its own exception to the Bankruptcy
Code, the Arizona statute was invalid because of the supremacy clause. Id.
53. In re Barnett, 15 Bankr. at 506.
54. Id. During the same month, three more criminal actions were filed against
the debtor for additional NSF checks. Id. Under Kansas law, in addition to a fine or
prison term, the court could require restitution to be paid to the victim. Id. at 507.
55. Id. at 512.

A Bankruptcy Loophole

1986]

criminal order of restitution." In In re Brown,57 a Tennessee bankruptcy court held that a state criminal court order of restitution
constituted debt and as such was dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.58 The court relied on section 524(a)(2),5' and the
supremacy clause to support its holding. In Brown, the debtor, while
intoxicated, drove his car into the victim's home causing physical
damage. Probation and an order of criminal restitution followed."
The debtor failed to pay restitution and filed for liquidation under
Chapter 7.62 The Brown court held that restitution constituted a
debt dischargeable in bankruptcy, and accordingly enjoined the
state prosecutor from seeking a revocation of the debtor's probation
on the ground that he had discharged the restitution award. 3 The
court further stated that all obligations incurred are dischargeable
in bankruptcy. 4 Here, bankruptcy is not restricted to business and
commercial transactions, but also includes state criminal orders of
restitution. 5 Further, the Brown court added that section 524(a)(2)
precluded any action taken to collect or recover a discharged debt,
and that any order to collect a discharged debt would be found to be
void under the supremacy clause.66 Therefore, at least in Tennessee,
a state court criminal order of restitution is dischargeable outright,
and any action to the contrary is void.
Jurisdictions which enjoin either the state criminal proceeding
or criminal restitution itself, rely heavily upon the United States Su7
preme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris.1
The Younger court
stated that a federal court may enjoin a state criminal court proceeding when the prosecution is acting in bad faith and without
56. In re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (a restitution award
is dischargeable in bankruptcy).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 829. The Brown court stated that section 524(a)(2) operates as a permanent injunction against the collection of any debt discharged. Id. If Congress
wanted to limit the effect of § 524(a)(2), it would have done so as in § 362(b)(1). Id.
60. Id at 821. The new § 523(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code rectifies any questions the bankruptcy court may have regarding the dischargeability of a similar debt.
Section 523(a)(9) accomplishes this by exempting from discharge any liability incurred while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a)(9) (West Supp. 1985).
61. In re Brown, 39 Bankr. at 821.
62. Id. The district attorney then attempted to have the debtor's probation revoked because of the debtor's failure to pay restitution. Id. The debtor then sought a
permanent injunction precluding revocation of his probation. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 822.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 829. The Brown court stated that the supremacy clause and the holding in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 657 (1971), bind all courts. In re Brown, 39 Bankr.
at 829. See supra notes 46 and 59.
67.

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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hope of obtaining a valid conviction. This reasoning, however, fails
to observe that the debtor's criminal conduct is the reason for his
appearance before the court, and not the creditor's efficient use of
the legal system. The Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge any
debt incurred as a result of obtaining money, property, or services
by false pretenses, false representations, or actual fraud. 9 In all of
the NSF check cases, the debtor has received money,70 property,"1 or
services 71 in exchange for a fraudulently written check. Therefore,
under section 523, the state court order of criminal restitution, even
if characterized as debt, should not be dischargeable. In either situation, whether restitution is or is not characterized as debt, creditors
may still bring a criminal action against the debtor for the NSF
check. Such a proceeding has been instituted in both situations, but
due to the timing involved in the proceedings, the criminal restitution was enjoined in one instance and in the other it was not. 73
In some jurisdictions, the entire criminal proceeding is enjoined,
while in others, the criminal proceeding is allowed to continue but
74
the bankruptcy court prohibits payment of any form of restitution.
Enjoining only restitution could be highly detrimental to the creditor. In NSF cases it is common for the prosecution to negotiate a
nolle prosse pleading in exchange for restitution.7 However, such
68. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54. A Younger rationale equates creditor actions with
actions brought in bad faith. Creditors are exercising a legal right given to them by
the state legislatures. If creditors act in bad faith when they utilize the NSF check
laws, then all of the NSF check laws should be changed or repealed. The holding in
Younger has been misapplied.
69. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
71. See, e.g., In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. at 281; In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. at 918;
In re Reid, 9 Bankr. at 831.
72. In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 12 Bankr. 85, 86 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1981); In re
Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
73. Compare In re Redenbaugh, 37 Bankr. 383 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1984) (creditor
enjoined from accepting any type of restitution) and In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (as a result of criminal proceeding creditor could not accept restitution) and Johnson v. Lindsey, 16 Bankr. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981)
(criminal proceeding will not be enjoined but state's attorney will be enjoined from
requesting restitution) with In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (restitution order is not a debt and not dischargeable) and In re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr. 129
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (state court order of restitution did not create a "debt" under
the Bankruptcy Code) and In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (restitution obligation not a dischargeable "debt" in bankruptcy).
74. Compare In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. 20 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (state court
criminal proceeding will be enjoined when it violates the automatic stay) and In re
Whitaker, 16 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (state court criminal proceeding
will be enjoined when creditor acts in bad faith); with In re Redenbaugh, 37 Bankr.
383 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984) (creditor enjoined from accepting any type of restitution)
and In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (as a result of criminal
proceeding creditor could not accept restitution).
75. See, e.g., In re Padgett, 37 Bankr. at 22; In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. at 922;
Lewis & Jennings, Bad Checks and Bankruptcy, FLA. B.J. 532 (October 1983).
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negotiation places the prosecution in a "Catch-22" position. If negotiation is attempted by the prosecution, it may be equated to bad
faith and the restitution will be enjoined. 7 The prosecution is then
left with the only other alternative: seeking incarceration. Ironically,
in an effort to protect the debtor, the bankruptcy court may actually
77
be forcing a jail sentence upon him.
The supremacy clause and section 524(a)(2) are integral parts in
the effective discharge of criminal restitution. All of the cases under
this category vitiate any possibility that a state criminal order of
restitution will be obtained or paid. This problem can be avoided by
characterizing restitution as nondebt.7 8 Currently, some bankruptcy
courts characterize restitution as "debt," the payment of which conflicts with the supremacy clause and the effect of discharge provision. However, where restitution is not considered debt, there is no
7
conflict and the problem is resolved. 9
NondischargeableRestitution
The rationale underlying the second category, nondischargeable
restitution, is that restitution is not a debt and, therefore, not dischargeable. The courts appear to utilize two separate views to justify
such a holding. The first view stands for the proposition that state
court ordered criminal restitution is not a dischargeable bankruptcy
debt and the bankruptcy courts do not have adequate jurisdiction to
enjoin the state court proceeding. 80 The second view is that criminal
restitution is simply not a debt contemplated by the Bankruptcy
Code and, therefore, not dischargeable."1 For example, in In re Button, 2 a criminal was ordered to make restitution after he pled guilty
to a petty larceny violation.8 3 The Button court held that restitution
76. Lewis & Jennings, supra note 75, at 533.
77. If the state court did impose upon the criminal offender a jail sentence instead of probation and restitution, the debtor would clearly not be able to discharge
the jail sentence in bankruptcy. See In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1984). Therefore, the alternative to incarceration should not be dischargeable. See
Lewis & Jennings, supra note 75, at 533.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 110-115.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1982) (criminal
offender can be ordered to pay restitution after debt occasioned by the offense has
been discharged); Matter of Davis, 15 Bankr. 442 (Bankr. D. Del. 1981) (bankruptcy
court did not have the power to issue permanent injunction against the state criminal
court and restitution was not enjoined), affd, 18 Bankr. 701 (Bankr. D. Del.), afJ'd,
691 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (restitution not dischargeable and bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to interfere
with state court's sentence).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 92-98.
82. 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
83. Id. at 693. The offender made partial repayment to the victim and subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Id. The debt was then discharged without objection
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was not a dischargeable debt, and the bankruptcy court did not believe it had jurisdiction to interfere with the state criminal proceeding.84 The court further suggested that a bankruptcy order had no
effect on a state criminal court order of restitution."
Although the analysis employed in Button for determining that
nondischargeability of restitution is within the ambit of the Bankruptcy Code, the court's statement that it did not have jurisdiction
to interfere with the state criminal proceeding was without merit.
Section 2283 of the United States Code provides that a federal court
has no power to enjoin a state court proceeding except where expressly authorized to do so.86 Section 105 grants that authority to

the bankruptcy court and provides that a bankruptcy court may issue any process or judgment that is necessary to carry out the intent
of the Bankruptcy Code.87 Under section 105, a federal bankruptcy
court has the power to enjoin a state criminal court proceeding, and
should do so when the bankruptcy laws are abused.8 Therefore, in
those jurisdictions which follow Button, restitution is not a debt, but
a criminal sanction, and thus not subject to discharge in bankruptcy.
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, are not concerned with
the exceptions to dischargeability, the effect of discharge provision,
the automatic stay provision, the dischargeability provision or the
supremacy clause. These courts instead look to the literal definitions
of "debt," "claim," and "creditor" and have determined that restitution is not a debt contemplated by Congress in the Bankruptcy
Code." Some of these courts have realized that restitution was not
from the creditor and the debtor was charged with violating parole because he did not
make full restitution. Id.
84. Id. at 694. The Button court concluded that restitution was not dischargeable because the definition of "debt," "claim," and "creditor," do not encompass
criminal restitution and because criminal restitution "does not create a financial debt
between private individuals, but rather a duty to the People of the State." Id.
85. Id. The Button court, citing People v. Mosesson, 78 Misc. 2d 217, 356
N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974), stated that restitution did not create a debtorcreditor relationship. Id. Futhermore, the bankruptcy courts should not be used as
the last refuge for criminals seeking to avoid criminal responsibility. Id.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
88. Matter of Davis, 691 F.2d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 1982).
89. See, e.g., In re Moore, 111 F. 145 (Dist. Ct. W.D. Ky. 1901) (judgment imposing a fine as punishment for violating a state statute is not a debt provable in
bankruptcy); In re Vik, 45 Bankr. 64 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (pre-petition criminal
order of restitution not equal to debt and not dischargeable); In re Pellegrino, 42
Bankr. 129 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984) (restitution not a debt contemplated by Bankruptcy Code and it is not dischargeable); In re Mead, 41 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984) (order of restitution not a debt and enforcement thereof did not violate automatic stay); In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (primary purpose of
restitution is rehabilitation, therefore, restitution is not equal to a debt and not dischargeable); In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. 800 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (restitution equal
to rehabilitation not debt, therefore, restitution is not dischargeable); accord In re
Newton, 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (restitution is a debt but not dis-
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intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship.90 These courts
characterize restitution as a process whereby criminals are rehabilitated and made to understand that society has been injured by their
actions.91
In In re Johnson,9 2 for example, the debtor pled guilty to the
criminal offense of fraud for authorizing 150 NSF checks.9 The
Johnson court recognized only two exceptions to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and stated that restitution was not one of them.94 The court
concluded that the only alternative was to find that restitution was
not classified as a debt, and consequently not dischargeable in bankruptcy. To determine the dischargeability of restitution, the bankruptcy court looked to the definition of "debt," which means liability on a claim,9 5 "claim," which means a right to payment," and
"creditor," which generally means an entity that has a claim against
the debtor that arose before filing.97 From these definitions the
Johnson court concluded that criminal restitution was not a "debt"
and the victim was not a "creditor" as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.98 Therefore, there was nothing to discharge in
bankruptcy.
Thus, under the second category, courts employ reasoning
which removes restitution from dischargeability by characterizing it
as nondebt.99 In evaluating the definitions of "debt,"' 10 0 "claim," ' 0 '
chargeable under Georgia law).
90. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. at 616; In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. at 803;
In re Newton, 15 Bankr. at 709.
91. See, e.g., In re Vik, 45 Bankr. at 67; In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. at 616; In re
Magnifico, 21 Bankr. at 803.
92. 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
93. Id. at 615. The offender was sentenced to a community correction facility
and ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 616. Five months later, the offender filed a
Chapter 13 petition. Id.
94. Id. The Johnson court looked to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) to determine whether
criminal restitution payments are dischargeable. Id. at 615. The court then determined that section 1328 only provides two situations which are exempt from discharge. The court did not specify what the two exemptions were but emphasized that
restitution was not one of them. Id. Therefore, the Johnson court decided that in
order for restitution not to be dischargeable, it was not a debt. Id. at 616.
95. Id. at 615.
96. Id. at 616.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 80-98.
100. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). Section 101(11) provides that "'a debt' means
any liability on a claim." Id.
101. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). Section 101(4) defines claim as:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; [or]
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
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and "creditor,' 10 2 courts have reasoned that restitution is not a form
of debt dischargeable under the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.103 These federal bankruptcy courts allow state courts to decide the criminality of the offender's actions. The criminal proceeding is specifically exempt from the automatic stay provision and no
debtor-creditor relationship develops from any order entered at the
proceeding. 104 If appropriate, the state court can order restitution.
The imposition of criminal restitution does not necessarily conflict
with the underlying purposes of the bankruptcy laws because crimi0 5
nal restitution is a statutory penalty for violating the law.1
Restitution is considered rehabilitative. It is meant to give an
unhardened criminal the opportunity to rectify a previous wrong.
The debtor's mark in a NSF check case is the victim of illegal conduct, unlike the unsecured creditor who is the victim of misfortune.'06 In addition, restitution will not afford the NSF check holder
preferential status because restitution will be paid out of post-petition earnings, whereas the unsecured creditor takes from pre-petition assets.107 Consequently, because under this view restitution is
not considered debt, no problem exists with the supremacy clause
and section 524(a)(2).10s Jurisdictions utilizing this reasoning pro-

mote the kind of relief Congress intended for the financially troubled, while denying relief to those who are criminally inclined. 0 9
puted, undisputed, secured or unsecured...
Id.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982). Section 101(9) defines creditor as an:
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or
before the order for relief concerning the debtor;
(B) entity that has a claim against the estate of a kind specified in section
348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of this title; or
(C) entity that has a community claim.
Id.
103. Courts suggest that the definitions of "debt," "claim," and "creditor" do
not encompass "criminal restitution." In re Vik, 45 Bankr. at 67; In re Pellegrino, 42
Bankr. at 132.
104. See supra note 90.
105. Mehler, Criminal Prosecution and Restitution under the Bankruptcy
Code, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 810, 821 (1983).
106. See id. at 830.
107. Id. at 822 n.36.
108. Id. at 831-32. Mehler contends that the supremacy clause problem can be
resolved by treating restitution as nondebt. Id. The state's restitution should be
viewed as a criminal sentence and as a by-product of the state court criminal proceeding. Id. at 831. Mehler concludes that if criminal restitution continues to be classified as debt, the supremacy clause problem will continue to exist. Id.
109. Congress did not intend for the bankruptcy laws to become a haven for
criminal offenders. In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 615, 616 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). To emphasize this point, Congress enacted section 362(b)(1), which allowed a criminal action to proceed in spite of a bankruptcy filing. Id.
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PREVENTING THE DISCHARGE OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION

The

contradictory

results

that have

evolved from

the

nonuniform application of "uniform" bankruptcy laws clearly indicate a need for reform. Two alternative proposals to correct this
problem will be advanced here. Both proposals effectuate the debtor
relief sought by the bankruptcy laws, yet preserve the states' rights
in adjudicating criminal proceedings in which restitution is sought.
Reform can be accomplished through either modification of the
definitional provisions, section 101, or through modification of the
nondischargeable provision, section 523. The first proposal is based
on the bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the definition provision,
section 101,10 and the term "criminal restitution" itself."' Under
this proposal, section 101 must be amended: first, to contain a definition of criminal restitution;.. 2 second, to define the term "debt" so
as to exclude an order of criminal restitution;"' third, so that the
term "claim" does not include an order of criminal restitution;"
and fourth, so that the term "creditor" does not include a criminal
restitution payee. " 5
110. See supra note 91.
111. Blacks Law Dictionary defines "criminal restitution" as "restitution programs under which the criminal offender is required to repay, as a condition of his
sentence, the victim or society in money or services." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1181

(5th ed. 1979).
Courts have suggested that "criminal restitution" is defined as a condition of
probation which is intended to be rehabilitative in nature, it can result in full or
partial payment of pecuniary damages suffered by victims in addition to fulfilling the
state's penalogical interests. See In re Vik, 45 Bankr. at 66-67; In re Pellegrino, 42
Bankr. at 137; Matter of Cox, 33 Bankr. at 661; In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. at 803.
112. Section 101(10) if enacted as proposed should read:
(10) "criminal restitution" means (A) a condition of probation which is intended to be rehabilitative in
nature;
(B) an amount which may result in full or partial payment of pecuniary
damages suffered by the victims;
(C) a type of penalogical sentence that results from a criminal conviction in which no debtor-creditor relationship exists; and
(D) an amount which is not dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.
113. Section 101(11) "debt" will have to be changed to section 101(12) if the
"criminal restitution" definition is adopted. The new "debt" definition, section
101(12) should read:
(12) "a debt" means
(A) liability on a claim; and
(B) does not include any order of criminal restitution.
114. Section 101(4) "claim" will have to be amended to read:
(4) "claim" - means ...

(C) does not include any right to receive an amount from a court order
of criminal restitution.
115. Section 101(9) "creditor" will have to be amended to read:
(9) "creditor" means .

..

(D) those entities contained in subsections (A), (B), and (C) of this paragraph and not any person or entity that is designated a criminal restitution payee.
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Amending the definitions in section 101 will eliminate the current ambiguities which gave rise to the differential interpretations
by the federal bankruptcy courts. The Button'16 and Johnson..
courts have applied the essential features of this proposal. Those
courts presently interpret the definitions of "debt," "claim," and
"creditor" so that the term "criminal restitution" does not fall
within the ambit of these definitions."' Under those interpretations,
criminal debtors are not allowed to discharge a state criminal court
order of restitution via the bankruptcy courts.1 9 Moreover, since
restitution would not be classified as a debt, there is no conflict between section 524(a)(2) and the supremacy clause. 20 Adoption of
this proposal would: (1) allow the criminal action to proceed under
the exception to the automatic stay provision in section 362(a); (2)
eliminate the supremacy clause and effect of discharge provision issues; and (3) reduce the possibility that bankruptcy laws will become a haven for criminal offenders.
The second proposal is to amend sections 523(a)(2) and
523(a)(7), which identify nondischargeable types of debts. Section
523(a)(2), the false pretenses provision, currently provides an exception to discharge for money, property, or services obtained as a result of fraudulent misrepresentations either actual or in writing.' 2 '
116. In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
117. In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
118. The Button and Johnson courts have essentially enacted this proposal
through case law. The same result occurs without formal legislation. However, the
application is not "uniform." Only legislative reform will allow for the "uniform" application of the bankruptcy laws.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 80-105.
120. See Mehler, supra note 105, at 831-32. See notes 37-38 and accompanying
text.
121. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985). Section 523(a)(2) currently provides in part:
a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . .
2) for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other
than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition; [or]
B) use of a statement in writing i) that is materially false;
ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for
such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied;
and
iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with
the intent to deceive. . ..
Id.
The proposal set forth amends section 523(a)(2) by adding subsection (D). See
infra note 122. The proposal attempts to resolve the criminal restitution problem by
allowing an exception for a check returned NSF, if the maker is convicted under a
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This subsection should be modified to specifically include debts
which arise from checks returned for non-sufficient funds.1 22 Further, section 523(a)(7) provides that any debt for fines, penalties 1 or
2
forfeiture paid to a governmental unit are exempt from discharge. 3
This section should be modified to expressly include court orders of
criminal restitution. 24 Amending the aforementioned sections eliminates the uncertainty and inconsistency currently experienced in determining dischargeability on the basis of whether restitution is a
debt. This proposal, by carving out express exceptions for criminal
restitution, would also eliminate any problem involving the
supremacy clause and the effect of discharge provision.
The decisions which follow the "restitution enjoined or discharged" reasoning could no longer provide bankruptcy courts with
any basis for enjoining or discharging a criminal order of restitution.
Additionally, even if bankruptcy courts utilizing the "nondischargeable restitution" reasoning, classify restitution as a debt, they would
still be prevented from discharging or enjoining that restitution.
Providing for restitution within section 523 also takes the subjectivity out of the bankruptcy court's process of determining the bad
faith of the prosecution.1 2 These provisions would allow the prosecution to seek restitution as a viable and socially acceptable alternative to incarceration.
state's NSF check law. See infra note 122.
122. Section 523(a)(2) should be amended to read:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141 or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal or refinancing
of credit, to the extent obtained by...
(D) the issuance of any check returned not sufficient funds (NSF)
in which the drawer can, will be, or has been convicted under the
NSF check laws.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982). Section 523(a)(7) currently provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ...
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for
actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982). The proposal set forth amends section 523(a)(7) to specifically allow for a criminal restitution exception. See infra note 124.
124. Section 523(a)(7) should be amended to read:
(a) A discharge under Section 727, 1141 or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, criminal order of restitution, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit.
If the courts which follow Button and Johnson should decide to discontinue
treating restitution as a non-debt, the proposed amendments to section 523 will ensure the "uniform" treatment of criminal restitution. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-98.
125. See Mehler, supra note 105, at 825.
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CONCLUSION

Congress is authorized by the United States Constitution to establish a "uniform" set of bankruptcy laws. Congress has attempted
to do so, only to fail at the hands of the federal bankruptcy courts.
Currently, the bankruptcy courts employ five different methods to
determine the dischargeability of criminal restitution with inconsistent and contradictory results. This chaotic application of the "uniform" set of bankruptcy laws does not meet the standard originally
intended by the drafters of the Constitution.12 Congress should
amend the current Bankruptcy Code and rid the bankruptcy courts

of the subjective inconsistency with which they are plagued. The
necessary legislation should be enacted to effectively dispose of the
bankruptcy loophole, thereby preventing criminals from taking advantage of the inconsistent application of the Bankruptcy Code by
the bankruptcy courts in criminal restitution cases.

Michelangelo Scafidi

126. Five states employ more than one view. Alabama: In re Godfrey, 472 F.
Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (bankruptcy court can enjoin criminal proceeding); In re
Bray, 12 Bankr. 359 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (bankruptcy court can enjoin state court
from granting restitution); In re Reid, 9 Bankr. 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981) (state
court proceeding must be enjoined). Colorado: In re Allman, 43 Bankr. 840 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1984) (county prosecutor enjoined from requesting repayment of restitution);
In re Johnson, 32 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (restitution not dischargeable in
bankruptcy). Georgia: In re Rose, 37 Bankr. 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (debts
tainted by fraud are dischargeable under chapter 13); Matter of Cox, 33 Bankr. 675
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983) (criminal prosecution debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re Newton, 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (criminal restitution not
dischargeable in bankruptcy). New York: In re HBG Servicenter, Inc., 45 Bankr. 668
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (restitution not a debt contemplated by Bankruptcy Code);
In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 12 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (state court proceeding
will not be enjoined by bankruptcy court); In re Button, 8 Bankr. 692 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1981) (restitution not a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy). Tennessee: In
re Brown, 39 Bankr. 820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (restitution is a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (state
court proceeding not enjoined but creditor prohibited from accepting restitution); In
re Wilson, 12 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (debts incurred through fraud are
not dischargeable in bankruptcy).

